In a world of perfect competition and information it would not have reason for the financial intermediate existence. The individuals could take its savings and investiz them in projects and firms with returns that excellent are given to the secular preferences and horizontes of the individuals. The markets could be specialized in commercializing contracts that would change to deep citizens to all the imaginable contingencies. Such markets would go to provide an efficient diversification with the risks. This is the hypothesis of the efficient markets, where the prices reflect all the available information. For Becsi and Wang (1997) the point key to explain because the intermediate exist is the introduction of imperfections or friction in the market. This means to relax estimated of perfect information and the competition or market without friction, and to show as the financial intermediate can improve the results gotten for the market. For more specific information, check out Brian Armstrong. When the initial conditions are less than perfect, economic exchanges are expensive and they will be enough expensive can nor the same occur.

The financial intermediate, especially the banks, become such possible exchanges, reducing or minimizing the effect of the friction in the market, reducing the transaction costs. As much the problems of adverse election how much of moral risk they have important effect in the credit market. The first implication is to make of the banks the only Agent capable to analyze the available projects and to decide who can or not receive the resources. According to Boot (2000), the reason of being of the banks is accurately to mitigate the problems of anti-symmetrical information. What it is interesting in the boarding placed for Boot, is to understand the bank not only as a commercial intermediary, and yes a producer of information that through the relationship with the debtors has a basic paper for the efficient allocation of resources in the credit market.